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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the mouse in the preserves. To allow recovery under the circumstances of this
case would open the door wide to fraud, as there is no standard by which damN.C.B.
ages could be measured.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-CONVICT
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Plaintiff asked for mandamus to compel defendant railroad to carry unbranded, convict made horse collars, harness, and strap goods in interstate
commerce. Defendant refused the tendered shipments because of the AshurstSumners Act,' a federal statute, which, (1) prohibited the interstate transportation of goods made by convict labor "where such goods are intended
or in any manner used, either in the original
..
to be received
package or otherwise" in states, etc. contrary to their laws, (2) directed that
all packages containing such goods be properly marked, including "the name
and location of the penal or reformatory institution." Three classes of shipments were involved: (1) Those to states whose laws prohibited the sale of
convict made goods. (2) Those to states whose laws did not prohibit such
sale, but required that the goods be marked to show that convicts had made
them. (3) Those to states which imposed no restriction upon sale or possession.
Held. Both provisions are constitutional, and the labeling provision is valid
2
no matter what the law of the state of destination. Mandamus denied.
The case is significant because it upholds the power of Congress to prohibit
the movement of harmless, useful goods in interstate commerce. Previous
prohibitions had been confined to goods inherently harmfula or goods whose
4
evil lay in the purpose of the transportation or to giving effect to policies of
5
Congress in relation to instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
The Ashurst-Sumners Act seemed to stand midway between two opposing
lines of cases-those upholding federal regulation of interstate shipment of
7
6
such things as diseased livestock, lottery tickets, women for immoral pur0
poses,8 and intoxicating liquor on the one side, and the Child Labor decisionlO
1
on the other. The Act had its prototype in the Webb-Kenyon Act, 1 but liquor
was recognized as inherently harmful to health and morals. The Supreme
12
and bridged the gap between
Court chose the approach of the liquor case,
112 A. 536, Houston v. Freemansburg Borough (1905), 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022,
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 149; Linn v. Duquesne Borough (1903), 204 Pa. 551, 54 A.
341, 93 Am. St. Rep. 800.
149 Stat. 494, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 61-64.
2 Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1937), 57 S.
Ct. 277
3Hipolite Egg Co. v. U. S. (1911), 220 U. S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364. (Bad eggs).
4 Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321. (Lottery Tickets).
Hoke v. U. S. (1913), 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281. (Women for immoral purposes).
5 U. S. v. Delaware and Hudson Co. (1908), 213 U. S. 366, 29 S. Ct. 527.
0Reid v. Colorado (1902), 187 U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92.
7 Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321.
8 Hoke v. U. S. (1913), 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281.
9 Clark Distilling Co, v. Western Maryland R. Co. (1917), 242 U. S. 311,
37 S. Ct. 180.
10 Hammer v. Dagenhart (1917), 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529.
1137 Stat. 699; 27 U. S. C. A. sec. 122.
12 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co. (1917), 242 U. S. 311,
37 S. Ct. 180.

COMMENTS
3
liquor and horsecollars with the air of the stolen automobile1 and kidnapl4
cases.
Here is the analysis used: First, free labor, properly compensated, cannot
compete with convict labor. The states can constitutionally deal with this
recognized evil so long as they make no discrimination between goods made
15
State prohibition can apply
in the state and those made outside the state.
to goods while still in the original package in the light of the Hawes-Cooper
Act.16 Second, the Ashurst-Sumners Act is similar to the Webb-Kenyon Act,
and although the subject is different, and the effects of the traffic are different,
still the underlying principle is the same. This is, that where the state may
constitutionally prohibit the subject of commerce in its internal affairs in
order to prevent harmful consequences, Congress may regulate interstate
commerce to prevent the use of that commerce as an impediment to state policy.
Third, since Congress can prohibit the transportation of convict made goods
in interstate commerce, it can do the lesser thing and require labeling. Fourth,
the fact that labeling was required regardless of the law of the state of
destination does not invalidate this provision, as its scope could reasonably
be deemed necessary to acomplish the legitimate purpose of the act.
The Circuit Court of Appeals17 said that Congress was not imposing a
policy on the states, nor interfering with the power of the states to regulate
their own internal affairs, but was merely aiding in the enforcement of the
declared policy of the states. In this way they attempted to distinguish the
instant case from the Child Labor decision.18 However, what the Supreme
Court actually seems to have done is to extend the theory of federal police
20
power developed in the cases dealing with diseased livestock,19 lottery tickets,
2
and intoxicating liquor ' to allow Congress to regulate harmless goods in
interstate commerce. This is something the court refused to do in the Child
22
Labor case.
The rationale of this parallel development of liquor control, and control
of convict made goods appears to be: not that Congress has divested intoxicating liquor and convict made goods of their interstate character, or that it
23
and
has delegated its own exclusive power to the states by the Wilson Act
24
recognized
Court
has
the Hawes-Cooper Act, but rather that the Supreme
in the states a general police power to protect the social interests of the sate,
even though the exercise of such power has an incidental and indirect effect

13 Brooks v. U. S. (1925), 267 U. S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345.
14 Gooch v. U. S. (1935), 297 U. S. 124, 56 S. Ct. 395.

11; Whitfield v. Ohio (1935), 297 U. S. 431, 56 S. Ct. 532.
1645 Stat. 1084, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 60.
17 Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1936), 84
F (2d) 168.
Is Hammer v. Dagenhart (1917), 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529.
187 U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92.
19 Reid v. Colorado (1902)
20 Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321.
21 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co. (1917), 242 U. S. 311,
37 S. Ct. 180.
22 Hammer v. Dagenhart (1917), 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529.
23 26 Stat. 313, 27 U. S. C. A. sec. 121.
24 In re Raher (1891), 140 U. S. 545, 11 S. Ct. 865. Plumley v. Mass.
(1894), 155 U. S. 461, 15 S. Ct. 154. Whitfield v. Ohio (1935), 297 U. S. 431,
56 S. Ct. 532.
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on interstate commerce, a field over which the federal power is exclusive
because matters concerned are national in scope. The rationale as to federal
police power is not that the Webb-Kenyon Act and the Ashurst-Sumners Act
divested liquor and convict made goods of their interstate character, but
25
extended the legitimate scope of federal
rather that the Supreme Court
legislation regulating interstate commerce so that this particular federal police
power operates constitutionally on goods which are harmless in themselves,
26
harmless in their use, and harmless in the purpose of their transportation.
27
has always been thought
This is a new field, because the Child Labor decision
to stand squarely in the path of such federal control.
It seems that the federal government has always had this police power,
but the court has refused to allow the federal government to exercise it as to
harmless goods, because the court could not find a social interest similar to
28
and lottery 2 9 cases to justify
those interests protected in the diseased cattle
its use. In the instant case the court has recognized the social interest in the
protection of individual life and welfare in industry as a social interest that
will satisfy the due process requirement. The influx of goods made by cheap
convict labor interferes with this social interest, and so the court permits
Congress to deal with the evil through its interstate commerce power.0
E. A. M.
MORTGAGES-RELEASE-PRIORITIES.-In 1915, the mortgagor gave appellee a
mortgage on certain land to secure a purchase-money note. In May, 1919,
the mortgagor executed a mortgage on the same land to appellant as security
for a promissory note given for a pre-existing indebtedness. Both mortgages
were duly recorded at those respective times. In August, 1919, the mortgagor
gave appellee a new mortgage on the same land to secure a renewal note.
This mortgage was recorded, and contemporaneously therewith the mortgage
of 1915 was released of record. In 1921, the mortgagor gave appellee a new
mortgage on the same land to secure a second renewal note. This mortgage
was duly recorded, and contemporaneously therewith the mortgage of August,
1919 was released of record. Appellee brought suit on his note and to foreclose
the mortgage. Appellant filed a cross-complaint upon his promissory note and
25 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co. (1917), 242 U. S. 311,
37 S. Ct. 180. Kentucky WhSp and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1937),
57 S. Ct. 277.
26 Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States, pages 300-303.
27 Hammer v. Dagenhart (1917), 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529.
28 Reid v. Colorado (1902), 187 U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92.
29 Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321.
3OBut see Baldwin v. Seelig (1935), 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497, as a case
where the Supreme Court refused to recognize the social interest in the welfare
of local industry as a valid reason for the exercise of state police power. The
court said that all state regulations enacted with the purpose, and having the
effect of supressing extrastate competition are unconstitutional, regardless of
the incidence of the regulation. See also 3 Univ. of Chicago L. R. 556.
Sl For notes on the decisions of the district court [12F Supp. 37, and of the
circuit court of appeals 84 F (2d) 168] in the case of Ky. Whip and Collar Co.
v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. See 49 Harvard L. R. 466, 13 New York University L. Q.
Rev. 287, 26 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 765, 21 Cornell
L. Q. 357.

